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Conservatism and Equity Ownership of the Founding Family 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of founding family ownership on accounting conservatism. Family 
ownership is characterized by large, under-diversified equity stake and long investment horizon. 
These features give family owners both the incentives and the ability to implement conservative 
financial reporting to reduce legal liability and mitigate agency conflicts with other 
stakeholders. Since CEOs can have different incentives toward conservatism, we focus on 
ownership of non-CEO founding family members in our investigation. We find that 
conservatism increases with non-CEO family ownership, supporting our prediction. This 
relationship becomes insignificant in family firms with founders serving as CEOs, either due to 
founder CEOs’ incentives to implement more conservative financial reporting or their power to 
thwart non-CEO family owners’ demand for conservatism. Overall, our paper adds to the 
literature on the impact of founding family ownership on firms’ financial reporting policy. Our 
findings are consistent with the recent evidence in the family firm literature that founding 
families exhibit substantial incentives to reduce agency and litigation costs and to maximize 
firm value. 
 
 
Key words: Family firms, conservatism, family ownership, family control  
JEL classification: M41, D8, G32 
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1. Introduction 
Conservatism has played an important role in accounting theory and practice over the past 
several decades.1 Although studies on the impact of debt-contracting on conservatism abound 
(e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008), very few have examined the role of 
equity ownership. In this paper we explore how characteristics of an important group of equity 
owners, founding family owners, affect financial reporting conservatism.  
Prior research proposes two key drivers of conservatism: agency costs and litigation costs 
(e.g., Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 
2010). We expect that the unique characteristics of family ownership will lead to greater 
incentives for family owners to demand conservative financial reporting, because family owners 
stand to lose more from potential agency costs and litigation costs. First, potential agency 
problems between shareholders and debt holders and between dominant and other shareholders 
can lead to ex ante price protection by debt holders and shareholders (e.g., high interest rates, 
stringent loan terms, liquidation of shares) and consequently higher cost of capital. Because 
founding family ownership is characterized by high ownership stake, multi-generation 
investment horizon, and a lack of diversification, family owners bear higher costs arising from 
these agency conflicts. To mitigate these agency costs, family owners have greater incentives to 
desire and implement conservative financial reporting.2  
Second, compared to other shareholders, family owners have greater litigation concerns 
because they bear more litigation cost due to their concentrated and under-diversified holdings 
in the firm and the multi-generation nature of their holdings (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Chen, 
                                                 
1 Givoly and Hayn (2000) report that since 1960’s, conservatism has been increasing over time. 
2 In fact, prior research has demonstrated that founding family owners are willing to forgo tax savings in order to 
prevent price discount from shareholders – as tax planning activities can be perceived by other shareholders as 
family owners extracting rent (Chen et al., 2010).  
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Chen, Cheng, 2008). Thus, the greater incentives to mitigate litigation concerns also lead family 
owners to desire and implement conservative financial reporting. 
Besides the greater incentives, family owners have the power to influence financial 
reporting. The large equity ownership of family owners and the fact that many family owners 
are involved in the daily operation of firms either as managers or as board members give rise to 
a greater ability to implement more conservative financial reporting.3  
We note two distinguishing features of our study. First, since our primary interest lies in 
whether the level of conservatism varies systematically with family ownership, we do not 
distinguish between conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of reflecting bad news 
versus good news) and unconditional conservatism (predetermined understatement of the book 
value of net assets). Though there is no consensus yet on whether contracting induces only 
conditional conservatism or both conditional and unconditional conservatism (e.g., Watts, 
2003a; Ryan, 2006; Qiang, 2007), it is well accepted that litigation concerns induce both 
conditional and unconditional conservatism. Consistent with our focus on the total level of 
conservatism, we use non-operating accruals developed and used in prior research (e.g., Givoly 
and Hayn, 2000; Beatty et al., 2008) as our primary measure of conservatism. This measure 
captures both conditional (e.g., impairment charges on long-term assets to reflect bad news) and 
unconditional conservatism (e.g., the immediate expensing of pension for employees hired to 
work on research and development) (Garcia-Lara et al., 2009, 2010).  
Second, the family ownership of interest is the ownership stake held by non-CEO 
founding-family members. As discussed in more details later, family CEOs can be different 
from other founding family owners when it comes to accounting conservatism. Prior research 
                                                 
3 Prior research documents that shareholders with larger ownership stakes held for longer periods are the ones that 
are most likely to engage in influencing managerial effort and firm policy (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; 
Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). 
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(LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) finds that conservatism decreases with CEO ownership, 
opposite to what we hypothesize for non-CEO family ownership; combining the potentially 
opposite effects of family CEO ownership and non-CEO family ownership will introduce bias 
and reduce the power of the test, making the results difficult to interpret. Focusing on non-CEO 
family ownership allows us to isolate the impact of non-executive family ownership on 
conservatism. This focus also helps distinguish our study from prior research which fails to 
document a significant impact of total family ownership on conservatism (Wang, 2006) and 
allows us to further explore whether founder CEO affects the association between conservatism 
and non-CEO family ownership. 
We empirically test the association between non-CEO family ownership and the extent of 
conservative financial reporting using a sample of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 unique firms in 
the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. The findings are consistent with our prediction that 
accounting conservatism is increasing in non-CEO family ownership. Our results continue to 
hold after controlling for CEO ownership, board independence, and director ownership and 
when we conduct the analyses within family firms. In separate analyses, we also document that 
family ownership dominates large institutional ownership (alternatively measured as holdings 
by top 5 institutional investors, dedicated institutional investors, and long-term institutional 
investors) in impacting the level of conservatism. 
We also test the impact of founder CEOs on the strength of the relation between non-CEO 
family ownership and conservatism.  The existence of founder CEOs can negatively impact the 
strength of this relation. Founder CEOs can implement more conservative accounting to reduce 
agency conflicts or litigation costs, thus rendering the effect of non-CEO family ownership less 
important. Alternatively, powerful founder CEOs may overwrite others’ demand for more 
conservative financial reporting, again leading to a weaker association between non-CEO family 
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ownership and conservatism. Our empirical analyses indicate that the presence of a founder 
CEO indeed weakens the relationship between non-CEO family ownership and conservatism. 
We also find some support that this is largely due to incentive alignment between founder CEOs 
and shareholders, instead of founder CEOs abusing their power.  
Our paper contributes both to the literature on conservatism and the literature on the 
impact of founding family ownership on corporate decisions and firm value. First, our evidence 
lends support to the argument that accounting conservatism is desired by shareholders who have 
stronger incentives to reduce potential litigation costs and agency costs, the two fundamental 
drivers of conservatism (Watts, 2003a, 2003b).4 Our study complements studies that document a 
negative relation between CEO ownership and conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 
2008) and a positive relation between conservatism and ownership of directors and certain 
institutional investors (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).  
Second, our paper contributes to the growing literature on founding family owners’ impact 
on firm performance, financial reporting, and tax reporting practices (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Founding family owners are the 
most dominant type of large, under-diversified shareholders in the U.S. (Anderson, Duru, and 
Reeb,  2009). On average, family owners hold 17% of the equity in family firms, and family 
firms account for 46% of S&P 1500 firms. The findings in our study are consistent with the 
evidence documented in this literature. Contrary to the popular belief that founding family 
ownership in public firms leads to wealth expropriation by family members, our results 
                                                 
4 We extend Wang (2006) who studies earnings quality in family firms and finds that family firms have less 
persistent transitory losses. We isolate family ownership from CEO ownership and document that CEO ownership 
and non-CEO family ownership exhibit opposite impacts on conservatism. These opposite results reinforce the 
importance of separating the ownership of the other family members from that of CEOs: CEO ownership primarily 
proxies for agency problems between managers and shareholders, while non-CEO family ownership captures 
family members’ concerns with litigation risk, debt costs, and investors’ perception of family entrenchment. Our 
findings highlight how the complexities of the ownership structure of modern corporations influence conservatism.  
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reinforce the overall evidence that family owners have substantial incentives to mitigate agency 
and litigation costs and to maximize firm value. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and variable measurement. Section 4 
presents research design and empirical results. Section 5 describes additional analyses and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
We base our empirical exploration on the theoretical premise articulated in Watts (2003a, 
2003b). In his reviews of the conservatism literature, Watts posits that agency costs and 
shareholder litigation are the two most important drivers of conservatism. The costs arising from 
agency conflicts and litigation concerns are ultimately borne by shareholders. These costs can 
be particularly severe for family owners, who have long investment horizon and large 
ownership stake and are under diversified. Unlike other shareholders, family owners’ wealth is 
disproportionately tied up in their firms and they cannot easily diversify their holdings.5 
Founding families’ equity holdings usually span multiple generations; the average age of our 
sample of family firms is about 50 from the year when the firm was incorporated. Such a unique 
position gives family owners stronger incentives, ex ante, to implement mechanisms, such as 
conservative financial reporting, to mitigate agency costs and legal liability. Below we discuss 
these drivers of conservatism and how founding family characteristics are related to these 
drivers, and develop our hypothesis on family ownership and conservatism. As mentioned in the 
introduction, our discussion will focus on the influence of non-CEO family ownership.  
                                                 
5 Family owners’ wealth is usually disproportionately tied up in their own firms. For example, when William 
Lauder, grandson of the company founder of Estee Lauder, stepped down, he made the following comment: “I am 
committed to the company. It’s the vast majority of my personal wealth and my family’s personal wealth – and we 
fully expect to be actively involved with this company going forward (The Wall Street Journal Nov 9, 2007 
‘Lauder Scion Way Out, P&G Executive Way In’).” 
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2.1 Drivers of conservatism  
2.1.1 Agency conflicts  
Agency conflicts lead to price protection that gives rise to a higher cost of capital. Family 
owners stand to lose the most from such price protection due to their substantial holdings and 
the under-diversified nature of their holdings. As such, ex ante they have greater incentives to 
desire conservative financial reporting to mitigate such agency costs.  
Equity-debt holder agency cost concerns. It is well-established in the accounting 
literature that debt holders prefer conservative financial reporting to guard their investments 
against distributions to shareholders such as cash payouts in the form of dividends or share 
repurchases, or against the increased riskiness of the firm’s assets through the firm’s various 
investment decisions (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In response to such potential conflicts 
with shareholders, debt holders price protect themselves by charging a higher interest rate, 
imposing more stringent terms, or choosing not to lend at all. Watts (2003a) argues that 
shareholders have incentives, ex ante, to use contracting mechanisms, such as conservatism, to 
mitigate debt holders’ price protection.  
The costs of debt holders’ price protection can be particularly severe for family owners, 
who hold disproportionately large shares in the firm and whose ownership is under-diversified. 
We thus expect family owners to have greater incentives to demand and implement 
conservatism to mitigate such agency costs. 
Owner-manager agency cost concerns. Another agency conflict shareholders face is 
with managers. Managers may not be forthcoming with bad news that is detrimental to their 
own interests (e.g., information about bad projects and poor performance). Conservatism 
constrains managers’ ability to defer reporting bad news and inflate earnings and as a result, it 
can help mitigate the owner-manager agency conflict (Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 
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2005). Findings of several recent papers are largely consistent with this prediction. For example, 
LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find that conservatism decreases with managerial 
ownership, an inverse proxy for owner-manager conflict. LaFond and Watts (2008) document 
that as the information asymmetry between owners and managers increases, conservatism also 
rises.  
Again with substantial wealth at risk, family owners have greater incentives to guard their 
wealth from being eroded by opportunistic managers, leading to family owners’ preferences for 
more conservative accounting. It is possible, however, that family owners can address the 
agency problems more effectively through other means, such as stronger monitoring, so that 
family ownership itself may not lead to greater demand for conservatism to help address owner-
manager conflicts.  
Dominant-small shareholder agency cost concerns. A less-studied, yet important, 
agency conflict is the conflict between dominant and other shareholders. Dominant 
shareholders, due to their large holdings, have more opportunities to extract rent at the expense 
of other shareholders (e.g., through empire building, perk consumption and earnings 
manipulation). In turn, other shareholders have incentives to price protect themselves against 
potential rent extraction by dominant shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Such price 
protection can come in the form of price discount or liquidation of shares held in the firm 
(Edmans and Manso, 2009). Thus this agency conflict also induces demand for conservatism, 
since conservatism can help alleviate empire building and earnings manipulation and reduce the 
cost of this agency conflict.  
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Family owners can be perceived as having greater incentives and opportunities to benefit 
themselves at the expense of other shareholders.6 We argue that due to the long-term and under-
diversified nature of their holdings, family owners have greater incentives to mitigate this 
perception of other shareholders by implementing conservative financial reporting. Consistent 
with this argument, empirical research provides support for the contention that family owners 
are willing to forgo tax savings in order to mitigate other shareholders’ perception of potential 
rent extraction by family owners (Chen et al., 2010).  
In sum, agency conflicts between various stakeholders lead to ex ante price protection by 
debt holders and shareholders. The potential higher cost of capital arising from price protection 
is ultimately borne by shareholders and it impacts family owners more negatively due to their 
large and under-diversified ownership. As a result, family owners have incentives to ex ante 
desire conservatism to mitigate these agency costs. 
2.1.2 Litigation cost concerns 
Accounting research has long documented that litigation concern under the 1933 
Securities Act encourages conservatism because litigation is much more likely when earnings 
and net assets are overstated than when understated (Beaver, 1998). Conservative financial 
reporting, by requiring a higher verification standard for gains than for losses, is more likely to 
generate an understatement of net assets. Furthermore, timely loss recognition under 
conservatism reduces firms’ liability exposure (Basu, 1997; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
Consistent with these predictions, Basu (1997) finds significant increases in conservatism in the 
                                                 
6 Anecdotal evidence shows that founding family members may engage in earning manipulations or misappropriate 
firm resources for personal use. Adelphia offers an extreme example of family rent extraction. In 2002 three 
members of the Rigas family that founded Adelphia Communications Corp were arrested and charged with looting 
the sixth-largest U.S. cable-television company “on a massive scale” 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1027516262583067680.html). The Rigases were charged with hiding $2.3 billion 
in debt and stealing company cash to put in their own pockets. The founder John Rigas was found to have ordered 
17 company cars and asked the company to purchase 3,600 acres of timberland at a cost of $26 million to preserve 
the pristine view outside his Coudersport home. In 2004 John Rigas and his son Timothy Rigas were convicted of 
conspiracy, bank fraud and securities fraud for looting the cable company and duping its investors. 
   
9 
 
two high-litigation periods, 1967-1975 and 1983-1990. In a cross-country setting, Ball, Kothari, 
and Robin (2000) document that conservatism is lower in countries with lower litigation risk. 
More recently, Blunck (2009) shows that higher ex ante litigation risk results in more 
conservative financial reporting and that after controlling for ex ante litigation risk, more 
conservative financial reporting is associated with fewer litigations and higher dismissal rates of 
filed lawsuits. 
Shareholders ultimately bear the costs associated with lawsuits, including both the direct 
costs of attorney fees and settlement costs and, more importantly, the indirect costs of the loss in 
share value following litigations, management time and effort diverted to handle litigation, and 
reputation damage. Founding family owners, who are usually among the largest shareholders in 
the firm, stand to lose more and thus have greater incentives to ex ante limit their legal liability 
through conservatism. In addition, Coffee (2006) argues that in the event of litigation 
shareholders who stay invested end up paying shareholders who no longer invest in the firm. 
Consistent with family owners’ greater concerns with litigation costs, Chen et al. (2008) find 
that family firms are more forthcoming with earnings warnings compared to other firms. Lastly, 
family owners’ wealth is disproportionately tied up in a firm, further strengthening their 
incentives to seek a reporting regime that limits litigation risk.  
Taken together, the above discussion suggests that because of large ownership stake, 
family owners have greater preferences for conservative financial reporting so as to reduce 
litigation cost and to mitigate agency costs that arise from equity-debt holder conflicts and 
dominant-small shareholder conflicts. The agency costs that arise from owner-manager conflict 
may not concern family owners because family owners can help alleviate such conflict through 
direct monitoring. Long investment horizon and a lack of portfolio diversification amplify 
family owners’ preferences for conservatism.  
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The same ownership characteristics that give rise to family owners’ greater incentives to 
demand conservatism also give rise to their greater ability, vis-à-vis other shareholders, to 
influence managers to implement conservative financial reporting. The recent development in 
the family firm literature indicates that family owners can influence corporate decisions (e.g., 
earnings quality, voluntary disclosure, tax planning) even when they do not hold the CEO 
position. Thus, we formulate our first hypothesis, in alternative form, as follows:7 
H1: Ceteris paribus, conservatism is positively associated with non-CEO family 
ownership.  
2.2 Conservatism in the presence of founder CEOs in family firms  
The discussions above highlight two conditions for the positive association between 
family ownership and conservatism: (1) family owners’ preference for greater conservatism due 
to litigation concerns and other stakeholders’ price protection, and (2) family owners’ ability to 
influence financial reporting. Many family firms still have founders as CEOs. The presence of 
founder CEOs in family firms has the potential to significantly influence the strength of the 
association between non-CEO family ownership and conservatism. 
Prior research and anecdotal evidence suggest that the presence of founder CEOs in family 
firms can lead to two different scenarios – founder CEO power and founder CEO incentive 
alignment. Under the first scenario, founder CEOs’ incentives are not well aligned with those of 
other family owners and other shareholders. Instead, founder CEOs use their overwhelming 
control and power in the firm to advance their own interests, potentially at a cost to firm value. 
                                                 
7 Critics of conservatism argue that conservatism allows firm managers to build hidden reserves that they can 
reverse into future earnings, thus conservative accounting is actually ‘aggressive’. Watts (2003a) directly addresses 
this criticism – future earnings are higher not because these earnings are aggressive, but because these earnings are 
verified and thus of higher quality (Watts 2003a, page 215). We also note that such criticism is unlikely to hold for 
founding family owners. The collective empirical evidence to date has shown that family firms have higher-quality 
earnings (e.g., Wang, 2006). Thus, we do not believe that founding family owners have incentives to understate 
earnings in one period so as to reverse the reserves back into earnings two or three years in the future to benefit 
themselves.  
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At the same time, founder CEOs, relative to other CEOs, can be powerful enough to thwart 
stakeholders’, including other family owners’, demand for conservative accounting. Indeed, 
founder CEOs usually hold an undisputed and powerful status when it comes to decision 
making, including financial reporting decisions.8 In extreme cases, founder CEOs have been 
known to dictate the reporting of manipulated earnings, leading to SEC enforcement actions 
against the firm (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996). That is, condition (2) as mentioned 
above, family owners’ ability to influence financial reporting, is less likely to be satisfied. 
Therefore, under this scenario, the association between non-CEO family ownership and 
conservatism becomes weaker. The impact of founder CEOs themselves on the level of 
conservatism is likely to be negative, since founder CEOs wish to pursue their own interest 
without the hindrance of conservatism.  
Under the second scenario, founder CEOs’ incentives are well aligned with those of other 
family owners and other shareholders. Compared to descendent CEOs or CEOs hired from 
outside of the founding family, founder CEOs are likely far more concerned about the legacy of 
the family name and the sustainability of the enterprises they started. Existing empirical 
evidence shows that firms run by founder CEOs exhibit better performance than firms run by 
other CEOs (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). These arguments imply that founder CEOs can have 
stronger incentives to implement conservatism to reduce litigation and agency costs compared 
to other CEOs. Thus, condition (1) as discussed above, other family owners’ preference for 
greater conservatism becomes less important, since founder CEO firms will exhibit a higher 
extent of conservatism regardless of the level of other family members’ ownership. The impact 
                                                 
8 Anecdotal evidence on family firms, such as Viacom Inc., Fidelity Investments, and News Corp., illustrates the 
iron grips the founder CEOs have over their firms. For example, the 84-year old Sumner Redstone, chairman of 
Viacom, is well-known for shoving a succession of ‘heirs apparent’ (e.g., Frank Biondi, a well-regarded media 
veteran; Mel Karmazin, the former CBS chief executive; Tom Freston, one of MTV’s founders; and his daughter 
Shari Redstone, who was named VP of the company after the departure of Karmazin) out of the door just when 
they seem poised to become credible successors, thus retaining his firm grip over the sprawling family-controlled 
media empire (see articles in WSJ, July 20, 2007 and The Financial Times, July 21, 2007).  
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of founder CEOs themselves on the level of conservatism under this scenario is likely to be 
positive. 
The above discussions imply that while the direction of the impact of founder CEOs on 
conservatism is unclear, under both the founder CEO power scenario and the founder CEO 
incentive alignment scenario, the impact of non-CEO family ownership on conservatism is 
likely weaker when founders are CEOs. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the positive relation between non-CEO family ownership and 
conservatism is weaker in the presence of founder CEOs.  
Note that the above hypothesis focuses on how the association between non-CEO family 
ownership and conservatism is affected by the presence of founder CEOs. The impact of 
founder CEOs on the level of conservatism is ambiguous (negative under the founder CEO 
power scenario and positive under the founder CEO incentive alignment scenario) and hence we 
do not present a formal hypothesis. Nevertheless, we test this empirically to help us gain 
additional insights. For instance, if founder CEO firms on average display a higher level of 
conservatism, then a weaker association between non-CEO family ownership and conservatism 
is likely a result of incentive alignment rather than a result of founder CEOs thwarting demand 
for conservatism.  
2.3 Conditional and unconditional conservatism 
We do not distinguish between conditional and unconditional conservatism in our paper. 
Conditional conservatism refers to the more timely recognition of bad news than good news in 
earnings and it is an ex post concept and news-dependent. In contrast, unconditional 
conservatism involves an ex ante commitment made by firms to recognize book value of net 
assets that are below their expected market value during their life time (Ryan, 2006).  
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We make no distinction between the two types of conservatism for three reasons. First, our 
investigation centers on the total level of conservatism, including both conditional and 
unconditional conservatism. Second, while many researchers believe that the distinction 
between conditional and unconditional is clear cut and only conditional conservatism is useful 
for contracting (e.g., Basu, 1997; Qiang, 2007), others (e.g., Watts, 2003a; Ryan, 2006) 
emphasize verifiability more and news-dependence less and argue that unconditional 
conservatism is also important. Thus, one might argue that while litigation concerns clearly lead 
to both conditional and unconditional conservatism, agency concerns can also lead to both types 
of conservatism (Watts, 2003a; Ryan, 2006). Third, Ryan (2006) conjectures that unconditional 
conservatism can be a far larger contributor to overall conservatism than conditional 
conservatism. In addition, conditional conservatism can be pre-empted by unconditional 
conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Qiang, 2007).  
Taken together, and especially given that our research focus is on the total level of 
conservatism, we believe that our research setting does not call for a distinction between 
conditional versus unconditional conservatism. As such, empirically we employ a measure that 
captures both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We discuss our measure of 
conservatism in more detail in the next section. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of 8,264 firm-years for 1,204 unique firms in the S&P 1500 index 
(S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices) covering the ten-year period 
1996-2005. These are the firms that have the required data from Compustat (for financial 
accounting information), CRSP (for stock return information), IBES (for analyst coverage 
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information), ExecuComp (for executive compensation and ownership information), and 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (for board information).  
Our collection of ownership and the founding family related information involves several 
steps. First, we start with ExecuComp and IRRC databases to identify key insiders (top 
executives and directors) for each company and compile ownership of each insider. Second, for 
each firm-year, we collect information about the founding family: the identity of founders, 
whether founders or their family members are actively involved (e.g., holding key executive 
positions, directorships, or large blocks of outstanding shares), and if they are actively involved, 
the ownership of the founding family. We obtain such information from Hoover’s Company 
Records, company proxy statements, and/or company websites. Third, we merge the above 
information with firm performance and characteristics data from Compustat, CRSP, and IBES. 
Additional information about corporate governance and institutional ownership is collected 
from IRRC and CDA Spectrum, respectively.  
Based on the collected information, we follow prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a) in defining family firms: family firms refer to firms in which founders or their family 
members (by either blood or marriage) are key executives, directors, or blockholders (defined as 
those with higher than 5% ownership). We also identify family firms where the founders are 
CEOs. In this paper, we measure family ownership as the ownership of family members who are 
not CEOs of the company. We choose this definition as prior research finds that CEO 
ownership, an inverse proxy for owner-manager agency conflicts, is negatively correlated with 
conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdury, 2008). We focus on non-CEO family ownership in 
order to capture family owners’ concerns with litigation risk and agency costs that arise from 
equity-debt holder and large-small shareholder conflicts.  
3.2 Research design 
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3.2.1 Measures of accounting conservatism 
Watts (2003a) defines conservatism as follows: “Conservatism refers to the cumulative 
financial effects represented in the balance sheet and to income or earnings cumulated since the 
firm began operation.” We adopt this definition in choosing our empirical proxy for 
conservatism.9 
Our primary measure of conservatism, NACC, is non-operating accruals averaged over the 
three years centered on the year of interest, as developed in Givoly and Hayn (2000). NACC 
consists of items such as restructuring charges, the effect of changes in estimates, and asset 
write-downs. Conservatism leads to lower cumulative reported earnings via slower revenue 
recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset valuation, and higher liability valuation. 
These practices lead to more frequent and more negative accounting charges. We measure non-
operating accruals as the difference between total accruals and operating accruals following 
Givoly and Hayn (2000), who document that cumulative operating accruals increase over time 
whereas cumulative non-operating accruals decrease over time. This measure of conservatism 
captures both conditional and unconditional conservatism, consistent with our conceptual focus 
on total conservatism.  
To mitigate the concern that our accrual measure captures random accrual errors or 
earnings management (which are transitory and likely reverse within a short period of time), we 
take the average of non-operating accruals over three years centered on the year of interest. 
                                                 
9 Penman and Zhang (2002) adopt a similar definition of conservatism: “By conservative accounting we mean 
choosing accounting methods and estimates that keep the book value of net assets relatively low. Therefore, LIFO 
accounting for inventories is conservative relative to FIFO (if inventory costs are increasing); expensing research 
and development (R&D) expenditures rather than capitalizing and amortizing them is conservative; depreciation 
methods that consistently use short estimated asset lives (so as to record depreciation in excess of economic 
depreciation) are conservative; and policies that consistently overestimate allowance for doubtful accounts, sales 
returns, or warranty liabilities are conservative.” 
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Doing so more properly recognizes the multi-period nature of accounting choices.10 We also 
replicate the main analyses using the difference in the skewness between earnings and operating 
cash flows (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Beatty et al., 2008) and other alternative measures. We 
discuss the results using these alternative measures in Section 5. 
3.2.2 Regression model 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regressions:  
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(2) 
For ease of interpretation, we scale NACC by lagged total assets, express it in percentage, 
and then multiply it by minus one. Thus, more positive values of NACC indicate greater 
conservatism. FAM is defined as non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN). We also use an 
alternative measure to capture family influence, the number of non-CEO family directors in 
family firms (FAM_CTRL). Note that FAM is zero for non-family firms. A positive 1 is 
consistent with H1: conservatism is increasing with non-CEO family ownership and board 
presence. In equation (2), we add an indicator variable for founder CEO (FOUNDER), coded as 
one for family firms run by founder CEOs, and its interaction with family ownership to test 
whether founder CEOs differentially impact the level of reporting conservatism in family firms. 
A negative (positive) 3 implies that the positive association between non-CEO family 
                                                 
10 We elect not to use the market-to-book ratio to measure conservatism in this paper. First, this ratio includes 
economic rents (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). Second, this ratio has been used to measure firm value in the 
prior family firm studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
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ownership and conservatism is weaker (stronger) for founder CEO firms than for other family 
firms. 
The choice of control variables follows prior research and the measurement of these 
variables is as follows:  
SIZE = Year-end market value of equity (Compustat data # 25 #199); log 
transformation is used in regression analyses; 
MB = Market-to-book ratio (Compustat data #25 #199/#60); 
ROA = Accounting performance, measured as earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data #18) scaled by lagged total assets (#6); 
OCF = Cash flows from operations (#308) scaled by lagged total assets (#6); 
RET = Buy and hold stock return in the fiscal year; 
RVOL = Return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(from CRSP) for year t; 
LEV = Leverage, measured as beginning-of-year leverage ratio ([#9+#34]/#6); 
AC =  Analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts for the firm during year t; log transformation (ln(1+analyst 
coverage)) is used in regression analyses; 
INST =  Institutional ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors in year t. 
Prior research suggests that conservatism likely varies with firm size. Given that family 
firms are on average smaller, we include firm size (SIZE) as a control. Although prior research 
has not demonstrated a clear link between investment opportunities and conservatism, we 
nevertheless include market-to-book ratio (MB) to control for the potential impact of growth 
and investment opportunities on reporting conservatism.11 We include a control for firm 
performance, ROA, since existing research demonstrates systematic performance difference 
between family and non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003a). Including ROA mitigates the 
concern that the documented difference in reporting conservatism is a by-product of firm 
performance difference. However, ROA can be mechanically related to NACC because both are 
outcome measures from the financial reporting process. Thus, we also include operating cash 
flows (OCF) and stock returns (RET) as additional firm performance measures. 
                                                 
11 A potential concern is that our growth measure, MB, is affected by accounting performance metrics. Thus in a 
robustness test we replace MB with percentage growth in sales. Our results remain unchanged.  
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We also entertain the possibility that family firms might exhibit different level of 
conservatism due to differences in the riskiness of investments between family and non-family 
firms. Risky investments can ex post lead to more asset write-downs and restructuring charges, 
which are captured by our conservatism measure NACC. If family firms tend to engage in 
riskier investments than non-family firms, it can induce a spurious positive association between 
family ownership and NACC. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) observe that large, 
undiversified shareholders tend to be more risk averse. In addition, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) 
document insignificant differences in equity risk (systematic or idiosyncratic) between family 
and non-family firms. Thus, we do not expect differences in the riskiness of investments to drive 
our results. Nonetheless, we include return volatility (RVOL) to mitigate the concern that the 
observed difference in NACC is influenced by differences in the riskiness of investments. 
Prior research finds that debt-contracting affects conservatism (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; 
Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008). Following prior studies, we use leverage (LEV) to proxy for 
this effect. We also include analyst coverage (AC) and institutional holdings (INST) to mitigate 
concerns that firms exhibit systematically different conservatism as a response to monitoring 
from analysts and institutional investors. In a later section (section 5.3) we provide more in-
depth analysis of the impact of concentrated institutional shareholdings on conservatism.  
Because family and non-family firms differ in industry membership and because accrual 
recognition varies across industries, we include indicators for Fama and French (1997) 
industries to capture industry fixed effects.12,13 To mitigate the influence of outliers, we truncate 
                                                 
12 Prior research usually includes an industry based litigation risk indicator to control for the impact of litigation 
concerns on reporting conservatism. Since we include industry fixed effects, this litigation indicator is already 
embedded.  
13 Family firms are on average younger than non-family firms. The average age (the number of years from the 
founding of the firm) is 48 for family firms and 73 for non-family firms. We include the log transformation of firm 
age as an additional control variable and our results are similar. We do not include firm age in the main regression 
because doing so reduces sample size and there is no well-accepted argument why conservatism should vary with 
firm age/maturity. 
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the top and bottom 1% of NACC and remove observations with studentized residuals greater 
than three, as in Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008).14  
Since the above model specifications are panel regressions, within-firm autocorrelation 
can lead to biased standard errors. Therefore our t-statistics are calculated based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering, as recommended by Petersen (2009).15  
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents our sample composition and descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that of 
the 1,204 unique firms in our sample, about half are classified as family firms, and close to 46% 
of the sample firm-year observations are from family firms. These statistics are consistent with 
prior research and attest to the significant presence of family firms in the U.S. economy. Among 
the family firm-year observations, approximately 41% (1,533/3,763) are managed by 
professional CEOs hired from outside the founding family, whereas close to 40% are managed 
by founder CEOs and the rest 20% are managed by descendant CEOs.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on ownership and governance variables, 
separately for family and non-family firms. Within family firms, the average non-CEO family 
ownership is 12.2% and there is on average one non-CEO family member serving on the board 
of directors.16 Including the ownership of family CEOs, family ownership is on average 17.1% 
for family firms. Average CEO ownership is about 0.5% for non-family firms and 4.5% for 
family firms. On average, there are 9.5 directors and 66.5% of them are independent. Family 
                                                 
14 Truncating at 0.5%, no truncation, or using different cut-off points for the studentized residuals do not change 
our inferences. 
15 We also estimate cross-sectional regressions for each year of the sample, calculate the time-series mean of the 
coefficient estimate and then compute autocorrelation-adjusted Fama-MacBeth (1973) standard errors using the 
method suggested by Pontiff (1996). The results are similar to those reported.  
16 Untabulated results show that the number of board seats held by non-CEO family members ranges from zero to 
six. 
   
20 
 
firms have smaller and less independent boards. In addition, family firms have higher total 
outside director ownership (6.2% vs. 1.7%) but lower non-family outside director ownership 
(1.2% vs. 1.7%).17 All of the mean and median differences between family and non-family firms 
discussed above are significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
Panel C of Table 1 tabulates the industry distribution. There are more family than non-
family firms in Recreational Products, Printing and Publishing, Apparel, Rubber and Plastic 
Products, Construction, Personal Services, Electronic Equipment, Transportation, Wholesale 
and Retail, Restaurants, and Trading. In contrast, non-family firms outweigh family firms in 
Healthcare, Chemicals, Steel Works, Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Petroleum and Gas, 
Utilities, Measuring and Control Equipment, and Business Supplies. We control for industry 
clustering by including industry indicator variables in our regression analysis.  
We present the descriptive statistics and correlations of test variables in Table 2. Panel A 
shows that, consistent with prior research, our sample firms on average have negative non-
operating accruals, indicating an overall level of conservatism in the sample (recall that NACC 
is multiplied by minus one). Panel B of Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for 
the test variables. The correlations between NACC and family ownership and control variables 
are insignificant at the conventional levels. The family ownership and control variables 
(FAM_OWN and FAM_CTRL) are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.546. 
Consistent with prior research, family ownership and control variables are negatively correlated 
with firm size, leverage, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership, and positively correlated 
with firm performance. Though most of the correlation coefficients among other independent 
variables are significant, the coefficients are fairly small with the exception of the correlation 
                                                 
17 The definition of ‘outside directors’ in existing research generally includes non-executive directors who are 
family members. We use this definition to be comparable to prior research, but in a later analysis we also isolate 
outside directors who are non-family members to more clearly distinguish between family and non-family director 
holdings. 
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between ROA, market-to-book ratio, and OCF ([ROA, MB] = 0.432, [ROA, OCF] =0.648) 
and that between analyst coverage and institutional ownership ([AC, INST]=0.630). One 
should keep these correlations in mind when interpreting the results on these variables. 
4.2 Regression results on the effect of non-CEO family ownership and control 
Table 3 presents our test results using non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) and non-
CEO family directorship (FAM_CTRL) to capture family ownership and control. Recall that we 
multiply the non-operating accruals measure by negative one, so a greater value of NACC 
indicates greater conservatism. We estimate equation (1) using all observations, including both 
family and non-family firm observations, as well as using only the family firm observations.18  
In Panel A we use the non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) to test H1. Column (1) 
reports the results using the full sample and Column (2) reports the results using only the family 
firm observations. Column (1) shows a significantly positive coefficient on FAM_OWN 
(t=3.24), suggesting that conservatism increases with the ownership of founding family 
members who are not CEOs, consistent with H1.19 Column (2) restricts the sample to the 
family-firm observations. The results are very similar to those in Column (1): conservatism 
increases with non-CEO family ownership.  
The results on the control variables indicate that large firms and firms with high market-
to-book ratio, low ROA, high operating cash flows, high stock returns, and high volatility are 
more likely to have large, negative accruals. The coefficients on leverage, analyst coverage, and 
                                                 
18 Restricting the analysis to family firm observations also helps mitigate potential concerns of survivorship bias. If 
better performing firms are more likely to remain as family firms, it will lead to better performance in family firms 
than in non-family firms. At the same time, note that the survivorship bias is more likely to impact firm 
performance/value than firms’ financial reporting choices and we have already controlled for performance in the 
regressions. 
19 Note that to the extent that family firms exhibit better performance than non-family firms (e.g., Anderson and 
Reeb 2003a) and given that our NACC measure is negatively correlated with ROA (Table 2, Panel B), we would 
expect to find family firms to be less conservative than non-family firms, contrary to our finding. This further 
suggests that it is unlikely that our results are driven by performance differences between family and non-family 
firms.  
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institutional ownership are largely insignificant. One possible reason for the lack of significant 
results for leverage is that leverage may not be a good proxy for debt contracting costs. 
To illustrate that family CEOs differ from non-CEO family owners in their preferences for 
conservatism and to highlight the importance of isolating non-CEO family ownership, columns 
(3) and (4) of Panel A report the results using total family ownership, including both CEO and 
non-CEO family ownership. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on total family ownership is not 
significant (at best marginally significant in Column (3)). This result confirms the importance of 
separating ownership by non-CEO family owners from ownership by family CEOs. 
In Panel B we replace non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) with the number of non-
CEO family directors (FAM_CTRL) as an alternative proxy for family influence. On average, 
there is one non-CEO family member serving on the board of directors, as reported in Table 1. 
The results remain similar if we use an indicator to capture two or more non-CEO family 
directors.  
The results in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A. Conservatism increases with the 
number of non-CEO family directors for the full sample. Thus, the stronger family owners’ 
influence on the board, the more conservative the financial reporting. The coefficient on 
FAM_CTRL in Column (2) (within family firms) is insignificant at conventional levels, likely 
due to the low variation in the number of non-CEO family directors within the family firm 
sample.  
We also estimate equation (1) using the number of family directors, including family 
CEO, and report the results in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B. The results are similar to those 
based on non-CEO family directors.  
4.3 Regression results on the effect of founder CEOs 
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While the last section documents a significantly positive relationship between non-CEO 
family ownership and the extent of financial reporting conservatism, this relationship can be 
weaker in the presence of a founder CEO, as stated in H2. To test H2, we estimate equation (2) 
over the full sample and the family-firm subsample, using FAM_OWN and FAM_CTRL as 
alternative proxies for founding family influence. We focus on the interaction between these 
two proxies and a founder CEO indicator. The results are presented in Table 4. 
Panel A shows that the coefficient on FAM_OWN continues to be significantly positive, 
consistent with the results in Table 3. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term 
FAM_OWN × FOUNDER is significantly negative in both the full sample and the family-firm 
subsample. This negative interaction term renders the net impact of non-CEO family ownership 
on conservatism insignificant in founder CEO firms (t=-1.00 and -0.65 for the full sample and 
the family-firm subsample). When we replace FAM_OWN with FAM_CTRL in Panel B of 
Table 4, we find qualitatively similar results. 
It is worth noting that the coefficients on the Founder CEO indicator are always positive, 
though only significantly positive in Panel B of Table 4 when we use FAM_CTRL in place of 
FAM_OWN. This result is more consistent with founder CEOs sharing family owners’ desires 
to curb litigation concerns and the perception of family entrenchment, and conservative 
financial reporting serving as one way to achieve that goal; it is less consistent with founder 
CEOs using their power to entrench themselves and thwarting other family owners’ demand for 
conservatism. As discussed in the hypothesis development section (Section 2.2), if founder 
CEOs are entrenched and do not wish to be constrained by conservative financial reporting, the 
coefficient on the founder CEO indicator (FOUNDER) will be negative. On the other hand, if 
founder CEOs’ incentives are well-aligned with those of other owners, they would desire more 
conservative financial reporting out of litigation cost and agency cost concerns and the 
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coefficient on FOUNDER will be positive. The positive coefficient on FOUNDER seems to 
indicate that founder CEOs are well-aligned with other shareholders in their incentives to seek 
conservative financial reporting. 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 The effect of CEO ownership 
In this section we analyze whether our results in Tables 3 and 4 still hold after we control 
for the effect of CEO ownership. For parsimony we omit the reporting of control variables 
going forward. We tabulate the results using the full sample and non-CEO family ownership for 
simplicity, while noting that the results of all additional analyses for the family-firm subsample 
or using the non-CEO family control measure are qualitatively similar.  
We start by replicating LaFond and Roychowdury (2008) and report the results in Column 
(1) of Table 5. Consistent with LaFond and Roychowdury (2008), we obtain a significantly 
negative coefficient (t=-3.46) on total CEO ownership. In Column (2) we examine whether non-
CEO family ownership still has a positive impact on conservatism after controlling for CEO 
ownership. Consistent with H1 and Table 3’s findings, the coefficient on non-CEO family 
ownership is significantly positive. The contrast between the positive coefficient on non-CEO 
family ownership and the negative coefficient on CEO ownership suggests that while non-CEO 
family members want more conservative financial reporting, CEO ownership is negatively 
correlated with conservatism, since agency costs of owner-manager conflicts are reduced with 
high CEO ownership (LaFond and Roychowdury, 2008).20 
                                                 
20 The opposite signs on non-CEO family ownership and CEO ownership also help explain why Wang (2006) fails 
to find any difference in the extent of conservatism (proxied by less persistent transitory losses in his paper) 
between family CEO firms and non-family firms. The difference between the two groups of firms reflects the 
combined effects of non-CEO family ownership and family CEO ownership on conservatism. Since these two 
variables have opposite effects on conservatism, aggregating them together, or using an indicator variable as in 
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In Column (3) we include the founder CEO indicator and the interaction between non-
CEO family ownership and the founder CEO indicator. We again document a significantly 
negative coefficient on the interaction between non-CEO family ownership and the founder 
CEO indicator. Thus, our primary results from Table 3 and Table 4 continue to hold. Note also 
that the significantly positive coefficient on the Founder CEO indicator is consistent with our 
findings in Table 4. 
Taken together, Table 5 suggests that even after controlling for CEO ownership, our 
results on the association between non-CEO family ownership and the extent of conservatism in 
family firms still hold.  
5.2 The effects of board independence and outside director ownership 
Using data for 306 S&P 500 firms from 1999-2001, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
document that conservatism increases with board independence and outside director ownership. 
They argue that this is consistent with the stronger monitoring role of the board when board 
independence and outside director ownership increases. In contrast, using a larger and more 
recent sample (1,519 firms over the period 2001 to 2004), LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
find a negative association between conservatism and total director ownership, where total 
director ownership includes inside director ownership as well as outside director ownership. In 
this section we investigate whether our results on the association between non-CEO family 
ownership and conservatism hold after controlling for board independence and outside director 
ownership.  
Consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2007), in Column (1) of Table 6, we document that 
total outside director ownership is marginally positively associated with conservatism, and the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Wang (2006), leads to insignificant results. This re-enforces the importance of examining the effects of non-CEO 
family ownership and CEO ownership separately. 
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coefficient on board independence, though positive, is not significant at conventional levels. 
Since in family firms the category of ‘outside directors’ includes family members who serve as 
non-executive directors, in Columns (2) and (3), we isolate the effect of non-family outside 
director ownership by separately examining non-family outside director ownership and non-
CEO family ownership. In Column (3) we further interact non-CEO family ownership with the 
founder CEO indicator. The results show that non-family outside director ownership is 
insignificant in both specifications, while board independence is marginally significant and 
positive in one specification. The lack of significant results for non-family outside director 
ownership is likely due to its small magnitude and the resulting low power of tests. 
More importantly, our results on non-CEO family ownership remain unchanged: after we 
control for board independence and non-family outside director ownership, conservatism in 
family firms increases with non-CEO family ownership but this association is weakened with 
the presence of founder CEOs.  
5.3 The effect of concentrated institutional ownership 
We argue that family ownership dominates institutional ownership in influencing financial 
reporting conservatism, since family owners have longer investment horizons and less 
diversified holding hence stronger incentives to reduce litigation and agency costs. Family 
owners also have greater abilities at influencing firm policies than institutional investors since 
family owners are more actively involved in running the firm as directors. We empirically test 
this conjecture by examining the impact of concentrated institutional ownership on 
conservatism, since the institutional investors with higher holdings and/or longer investment 
horizons are the ones that are most likely to exert significant influence on firms’ financial 
reporting decisions.  
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We measure concentrated institutional ownership using the following three alternative 
proxies: the percentage of holdings by the top 5 institutional owners, by dedicated institutional 
owners (Bushee, 1998), and by long-term institutional owners (Gasper et al., 2005). We also 
include other institutional ownership, the difference between total institutional ownership and 
concentrated institutional ownership, in the regressions for completeness. We thus drop the 
control variable of total institutional ownership (INST) from the regressions. The results are 
reported in Table 7. Table 7 shows that none of the coefficients on the three proxies for 
concentrated institutional holdings are significant at conventional levels. In contrast, our results 
on non-CEO family ownership continue to hold. In sum, the results confirm that family 
ownership dominates institutional ownership in influencing accounting conservatism.  
5.4 Alternative measures of conservatism 
In our primary empirical analyses we use non-operating accruals (NACC) to capture the 
extent of conservatism in financial reporting. We also employ alternative ways to measure 
conservatism. We discuss them below. 
5.4.1 The difference in the skewness of earnings and cash flows 
We replicate the primary analyses using the difference in the skewness of earnings and 
cash flows, to corroborate our findings. This measure has been used in prior research (Givoly 
and Hayn, 2000; Beatty et al., 2008) to capture the extent of conservatism. The intuition behind 
this measure is that conservatism will lead to greater left-skewness in the distribution of 
earnings, relative to the distribution of cash flows, since firms take large negative charges to 
reflect bad news. We measure the skewness of cash flows and earnings over three-year time 
periods centered on the year of interest. Specifically, skewness is defined as 3 3( ) /y E x    , 
where  and  are the mean and standard deviation of the x distribution, where x is ROA or 
CFO/Assets. We capture the difference between the skewness of earnings and cash flows by 
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taking the difference: SKEW= skewness (ROA)skewness(CFO/Assets). Similar to the NACC 
measure, we 1) multiple the skewness difference by 1 so that greater values of SKEW indicate 
greater conservatism, 2) truncate the top and bottom 1% of the SKEW measure and remove 
observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. Our results (untabulated; available upon 
request) using SKEW are weaker than, but qualitatively similar to, those obtained using NACC.  
5.4.2 Conservatism measured using the Basu (1997) approach 
A widely-used measure of conservatism in the literature is the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
measure (Basu, 1997), which captures conditional conservatism. Using Basu’s measure can be 
problematic in our setting for two reasons. First, we are interested in the total level of 
conservatism, not just conditional conservatism, because litigation cost concerns induce both 
conditional and unconditional conservatism (Watts, 2003a; Qiang, 2007). Second, the factors 
that drive differential demand for conservatism also drive differences in voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., litigation costs). For example, firms concerned with litigation costs are more likely to 
disclose bad news early and they are also more likely to exhibit higher conservatism. In such a 
case, Givoly et al. (2007) find that the Basu measure will understate the degree of conservatism.  
The second issue is particularly problematic in our setting, because family firms exhibit 
different voluntary disclosure behavior from other firms (Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). For 
example, Chen et al. (2008) find that family firms, out of greater concerns for litigation, are 
more likely to give earnings warnings than other firms. In addition, in our research context we 
have to introduce many interaction terms when using the Basu measure, which results in 
potentially severe multicollinearity problems.  
Nevertheless, we estimate the Basu regression with multiple interaction terms using our 
non-CEO family ownership variable. Untabulated results (available upon request) show that 
none of the interaction terms that reflect the impact of non-CEO family ownership on 
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conservatism is significant at conventional levels, likely due to the inherent issues discussed 
above.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the impact of founding family ownership on conservatism. We 
argue that founding family owners’ large ownership stake, undiversified holdings, and long 
investment horizon give rise to their greater concerns over two key drivers of conservatism – 
agency and litigation costs.  
The agency conflicts between equity and debt holders and between family owners and 
other shareholders can lead to potential price protection from debt holders and other 
shareholders. The substantial stake of family owners means that these owners stand to bear a 
large share of the costs of such price protection and the costs of litigation. Family owners 
therefore have strong incentives to demand conservative financial reporting in order to reduce 
legal liability and mitigate agency costs. In addition, family owners are actively involved in the 
firm as directors so that they have abilities to influence financial reporting policies. Thus we 
expect to find that conservatism increases with family equity ownership. In our empirical tests 
we focus on the ownership of non-CEO family owners. We also use the number of non-CEO 
family directors as an alternative proxy for the founding family’s influence. 
The motivation for the focus on non-CEO family owners is two-fold. First, family firms 
constitute a significant part of the U.S. economy: more than 46% of the firms in the S&P 1500 
index are family firms and non-CEO family owners hold substantial equity ownership in these 
firms (average ownership is 12%) and on average have one seat on the board of directors. Their 
ownership and influence make them an ideal candidate to examine the impact of large 
shareholders on conservatism. Existing studies have focused primarily on the debt contracting 
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role of conservatism whereas research on the role of equity ownership in influencing 
conservatism is sparse. Second, by separating the ownership of other family members from the 
ownership of CEOs, we are able to draw clear inference on the impact of large owners who are 
not managers.  
Since our focus is on the total level of conservatism, we use non-operating accruals as our 
proxy for conservatism, as this measure captures both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. We find that conservatism is increasing in non-CEO family ownership and 
directorship, consistent with our prediction. However, this positive association is ameliorated in 
founder CEO firms. Further analysis reveals that founder CEO firms tend to exhibit a greater 
extent of conservatism, thus rendering the ownership of other family members less critical in the 
implementation of conservatism.  
These results still hold after we further control for the impact of CEO ownership, board 
independence, director ownership, and the ownership of other large shareholders, such as 
institutional investors with large shareholdings and/or long investment horizons. Thus, our 
results indicate that conservatism’s importance/use increases with family equity holdings and 
representations on the board.  
This paper contributes to the literature on conservatism by examining a little-studied 
determinant of conservatism: ownership and control by founding family members, the most 
predominant type of large, under-diversified shareholders in the U.S. Our investigation also 
extends the family firm literature and our evidence is consistent with the findings of this larger 
literature: instead of extracting rents from other stakeholders, family owners demonstrate 
substantial incentives to mitigate agency conflicts and prevent firm value reduction.
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 Table 1 
Sample Composition 
 
This table reports the composition of our sample, which consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in 
the S&P 1500 index (S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices) covering the period 
1996-2005. 
 
Panel A: Sample composition 
 
 
Number of 
firm-years Percent
Number of 
firms Percent
Total 8,264 100% 1,204 100%
 
Composition by S&P index     
S&P 500 3,383 41.0% 426 35.4%
S&P Mid Cap 400  2,242 27.1% 330 27.4%
S&P Small Cap 600  2,639 31.9% 448 37.2%
  
Composition by firm type     
Family firms* 3,763 45.5% 606 50.3%
Non-family firms 4,501 54.5% 598 49.7%
  
Composition of family firms by CEO type 
Founder CEO firms 1,494 18.1% 302 25.1%
Descendant CEO firms  736 8.9% 99 8.2%
Professional CEO family firms  1,533 18.6% 205 17.0%
 
* Family firms refer to firms where members of the founding family, either by blood or marriage, 
continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders (higher than 5% 
ownership) of the firm.  
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of ownership and board variables separately for family and non-family firms 
 
 All Firms  Family firms  Non-family firms 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Non-CEO family ownership 8,264 0.054 0.000  3,763 0.122 0.063  4,501 0.000 0.000 
Non-CEO family directorship  8,264 0.528 0.000  3,763 1.170 1.000  4,501 0.000 0.000 
Family ownership 8,264 0.078 0.000  3,763 0.171 0.093  4,501 0.000 0.000 
CEO ownership  8,213 0.024 0.003  3,741 0.045 0.018  4,472 0.005 0.002 
Board size 8,264 9.517 9.000  3,763 9.215 9.000  4,501 9.770 10.000 
Board independence 8,264 0.665 0.667  3,763 0.600 0.600  4,501 0.720 0.750 
Total outside director ownership 8,110 0.037 0.005  3.680 0.062 0.011  4,430 0.017 0.003 
Non-family outside director ownership 8,110 0.015 0.004  3.680 0.012 0.004  4,430 0.017 0.003 
 
Definition of variables:  
Non-CEO family ownership = Proportion of shares owned by founding family members who are not the CEO in year t; 
Non-CEO family directorship = The number of founding family members who are not the CEO but are directors on the board in year t; 
Family ownership = Proportion of shares owned by founding families in year t; 
CEO ownership = Proportion of shares owned by CEOs in year t; 
Board size = Board size in year t, measured as the number of directors on the board; 
Board independence = Proportion of independent directors on the board; as in prior research, independent directors refer to 
those who are not corporate executives and have no business relationship with the company; 
Total outside director ownership = Percentage of shares owned by all outside directors, including non-executive family directors, in year t; 
Non-family outside director ownership = Percentage of shares owned by non-family outside directors in year t; this variable includes ownership 
of directors who are neither executives nor family members. 
 
Note that all differences between family and non-family firms are significant at the 5% level or better. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution of sample firm-years, by firm type 
 
Industry 
(per Fama and French 1997) 
Non-family firms  
(firm-years)  
Family firms 
(firm-years)  
Family 
firms%  
Food products 95  93  49% 
Recreational products 20  46  70% 
Entertainment 19  23  55% 
Printing and publishing 30  90  75% 
Consumer goods 94  95  50% 
Apparel 69  90  57% 
Healthcare 84  49  37% 
Medical equipment 106  115  52% 
Pharmaceutical products 162  151  48% 
Chemicals 177  97  35% 
Rubber and plastic products 20  29  59% 
Construction materials 85  92  52% 
Construction 48  65  58% 
Steel works, etc. 100  42  30% 
Machinery 239  123  34% 
Electrical equipment 85  45  35% 
Automobile and trucks 89  74  45% 
Petroleum and gas 221  124  36% 
Utilities 555  36  6% 
Telecommunications 41  45  52% 
Personal services 26  47  64% 
Business services 378  326  46% 
Computers 144  108  43% 
Electronic equipment 270  357  57% 
Measuring and control equipment 151  62  29% 
Business supplies 145  71  33% 
Transportation 104  151  59% 
Wholesale 108  189  64% 
Retail 218  365  63% 
Restaurants, hotel, motel 67  112  63% 
Banking 40  27  40% 
Insurance 129  143  53% 
Trading 93  128  58% 
Other* 279  126  31% 
 
* Other industries include those industries that have less than 20 observations: Agriculture, Aircraft, 
Alcoholic beverages, Candy and soda, Coal, Defense, Fabricated products, Miscellaneous, Nonmetallic 
mining, Precious metals, Real estate, Shipbuilding and railroad equipment, Shipping containers, Textiles, 
and Tobacco products. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Test Variables 
 
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. This 
table reports the descriptive statistics for the test variables. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of test variables  
 
  Mean  Std. Q1 Median Q3 
      
NACC 0.527 3.661 -1.392 0.389 2.267 
FAM_OWN 0.054 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.031 
FAM_CTRL 0.528 0.935 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 7.627 1.488 6.514 7.480 8.560 
MB 3.463 3.124 1.679 2.472 4.036 
ROA 0.067 0.078 0.027 0.059 0.105 
OCF 0.109 0.074 0.062 0.102 0.150 
RET 0.175 0.432 -0.096 0.126 0.370 
RVOL 0.025 0.011 0.017 0.023 0.031 
LEV 0.225 0.171 0.070 0.219 0.342 
AC 9.318 7.878 3.000 8.000 14.000 
INST 0.589 0.278 0.469 0.652 0.788 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix for NACC and the test variables* 
 
NACC 
FAM_ 
OWN 
FAM_ 
CTRL SIZE MB ROA OCF RET RVOL LEV AC
FAM_ 
OWN -0.018    
FAM_ 
CTRL -0.009 0.546   
SIZE 0.033 -0.098 -0.079 
MB 0.004 -0.029 -0.010 0.363
ROA -0.209 0.016 0.028 0.143 0.432
OCF 0.203 0.017 0.038 0.113 0.355 0.648
RET -0.025 -0.008 -0.006 -0.121 -0.082 0.206 0.126
RVOL 0.049 -0.021 -0.016 -0.233 0.114 -0.105 -0.049 -0.064
LEV 0.010 -0.047 -0.054 0.099 -0.089 -0.280 -0.230 -0.020 -0.189 
AC 0.037 -0.087 -0.064 0.426 0.197 0.120 0.129 0.019 0.021 -0.038
INST 0.064 -0.042 -0.073 -0.004 0.036 0.054 0.068 0.031 0.038 -0.068 0.630
 
*Numbers in bold indicate that the correlations are significant at the 5% level or better. 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
 
Definition of variables: 
 
NACC =  The average of non-operating accruals for three years centered on year t. Non-operating 
accruals in each year is measured as: 
 100  {Total accruals (before depreciation)  Operating accruals}/ lagged total assets 
=  100  {[(Net Income + Depreciation)  Cash flow from operations]  (Accounts 
receivable +Inventories+Prepaid expensesAccounts payableTaxes payable)} / 
lagged total assets; 
FAM_OWN = The proportion of shares held by non-CEO founding family members in year t; 
FAM_CTRL = The number of non-CEO founding family members who serve as directors in year t; 
SIZE = Log transformations of year-end market value of equity (Compustat data # 25 #199);  
MB = Market-to book-ratio (Compustat data #25 #199/#60); 
ROA = Accounting performance, measured as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
data #18) scaled by lagged total assets (#6); 
OCF = Cash flows from operations (#308) scaled by lagged total assets (#6); 
RET = Buy and hold stock return in the year; 
RVOL = Return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for year t; 
LEV = Leverage, measured as beginning-of-year leverage ratio ([#9+#34]/#6); 
AC =  Analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the 
firm during year t; log transformation (ln(1+analyst coverage)) is used in regression 
analyses; 
INST =  Institutional ownership, measured as the aggregate percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors per CDA in year t. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results – Ownership and Control by Non-CEO Family Members 
  
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. The 
regression model is as follows: 
titititi
titititititititi
mmiesIndustryDuINSTACLEV
RVOLRETOCFROAMBSIZEFAMNACC
,,10,9,8
,7,6,5,4,3,2,1, 



,  (1) 
The dependent variable (NACC) is the negative of three-year average non-operating accruals times 100. 
FAM is non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) in panel A and non-CEO family control 
(FAM_CTRL) in panel B. See notes to Table 2 for definitions of variables. Firm and year clustered t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Regression results using family ownership 
 
  
Using non-CEO family ownership: 
Testing H1 
 Using total family ownership, 
including ownership by family CEOs 
  
Predicted 
signs 
The full 
sample 
(1) 
Within family 
firms 
(2) 
 The full 
Sample 
(3) 
Within family 
Firms 
(4) 
Intercept   -3.577 -4.532  -3.478 -4.421 
   (-6.35) (-6.21)  (-6.34) (-6.22) 
FAM_OWN  + 0.581 0.621  0.225 0.192 
   (3.24) (2.35)  (1.84) (0.97) 
SIZE   0.125 0.224  0.121 0.226 
   (2.35) (2.84)  (2.70) (3.87) 
MB   0.069 0.087  0.071 0.088 
   (3.85) (5.14)  (5.11) (3.67) 
ROA   -28.609 -30.654  -28.720 -30.879 
   (-55.23) (-34.23)  (-30.82) (-23.34) 
OCF   30.016 31.500  29.813 31.034 
   (60.47) (43.19)  (50.83) (24.99) 
RET   0.237 0.221  0.251 0.286 
   (2.15) (1.06)  (2.31) (1.83) 
RVOL   29.324 25.517  28.005 22.186 
   (3.75) (1.91)  (3.57) (2.34) 
LEV   0.058 0.274  0.098 0.481 
   (0.19) (0.64)  (0.25) (1.01) 
AC   0.020 -0.018  0.011 -0.051 
   (0.18) (-0.19)  (0.17) (-0.56) 
INST   0.089 0.417  0.428 0.618 
   (1.84) (1.12)  (1.94) (1.96) 
        
Industry indicators   YES YES  YES YES 
N   8,264 3,680  8,264 3,680 
Adj. R2   0.350 0.390  0.348 0.387 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression results using family control 
 
  
Using non-CEO family control: 
Testing H1 
 Using total family control, including 
board seats held by family CEOs 
  
Predicted 
signs 
The full 
sample 
(1) 
Within family 
firms 
(2) 
 The full 
Sample 
(3) 
Within family 
Firms 
(4) 
Intercept   -3.522 -4.301  -3.588 -4.343 
   (-6.79) (-6.33)  (-7.17) (-6.60) 
FAM_CTRL  + 0.064 -0.023  0.073 -0.005 
   (3.39) (-1.09)  (2.26) (-0.14) 
SIZE   0.124 0.222  0.128 0.224 
   (2.38) (2.85)  (3.18) (3.88) 
MB   0.070 0.087  0.070 0.086 
   (3.79) (4.63)  (4.99) (3.37) 
ROA   -28.725 -30.709  -28.763 -30.648 
   (-53.88) (-33.63)  (-34.05) (-24.44) 
OCF   29.872 31.074  29.924 31.081 
   (54.90) (35.50)  (53.74) (25.23) 
RET   0.252 0.281  0.248 0.283 
   (2.45) (1.42)  (2.26) (1.67) 
RVOL   28.359 22.801  28.094 23.276 
   (3.64) (2.07)  (3.70) (2.51) 
LEV   0.097 0.495  0.084 0.498 
   (0.27) (1.23)  (0.21) (1.05) 
AC   0.007 -0.049  0.005 -0.052 
   (0.01) (-0.36)  (0.09) (-0.57) 
INST   0.436 0.540  0.461 0.543 
   (1.93) (0.96)  (2.40) (1.69) 
        
Industry indicators   YES YES  YES YES 
N   8,264 3,680  8,264 3,680 
Adj. R2   0.351 0.388  0.351 0.388 
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Table 4  
The Effect of Founder CEOs 
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. The 
regression model is as follows: 
ti
tititititititi
tititititititi
mmiesIndustryDu
INSTACLEVRVOLRETOCFROA
MBSIZEFOUNDERFAMFOUNDERFAMNACC
,
,12,11,10,9,8,7,6
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





(2) 
The dependent variable (NACC) is the negative of three-year average non-operating accruals times 100. 
FAM is non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) in panel A and non-CEO family control 
(FAM_CTRL) in panel B. FOUNDER is the founder CEO indicator. See notes to Table 2 for definitions 
of variables. Firm and year clustered t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Regression results using family ownership 
 
Predicted 
signs 
Full sample 
(1) 
Within family firms 
(2) 
Intercept  -3.394 -4.071 
  (-6.33) (-5.71) 
FAM_OWN + 0.888 0.755 
  (4.46) (2.68) 
FOUNDER  ? 0.186 0.084 
  (1.59) (0.59) 
FAM_OWN × FOUNDER - -1.336 -1.045 
  (-4.06) (-2.86) 
SIZE  0.108 0.185 
  (2.35) (2.43) 
MB  0.058 0.070 
  (3.85) (2.80) 
ROA  -28.781 -31.014 
  (-55.23) (-33.35) 
OCF  30.581 31.753 
  (60.47) (43.53) 
RET  0.173 0.167 
  (2.15) (0.83) 
RVOL  27.393 26.773 
  (3.75) (1.82) 
LEV  0.017 0.032 
  (0.19) (0.06) 
AC  0.009 -0.013 
  (0.18) (-0.05) 
INST  0.381 0.456 
  (1.84) (1.01) 
    
Industry indicators  YES YES 
N  8,264 3,680 
Adj. R2  0.388 0.424 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression results using family control 
 
 
Predicted 
signs 
Full sample 
(1) 
Within family firms 
(2) 
Intercept  -3.658 -4.487 
  (-6.53) (-5.71) 
FAM_CTRL + 0.136 0.095 
  (4.72) (1.71) 
FOUNDER ? 0.285 0.299 
  (4.99) (3.08) 
FAM_CTRL× FOUNDER - -0.290 -0.321 
  (-2.41) (-1.86) 
SIZE  0.134 0.224 
  (2.50) (2.80) 
MB  0.068 0.086 
  (3.69) (4.51) 
ROA  -28.697 -30.401 
  (-59.51) (-27.88) 
OCF  29.869 31.071 
  (57.62) (33.43) 
RET  0.263 0.260 
  (2.52) (1.46) 
RVOL  27.449 22.594 
  (3.72) (1.90) 
LEV  0.154 0.598 
  (0.39) (1.35) 
AC  -0.006 -0.050 
  (-0.15) (-0.37) 
INST  0.497 0.462 
  (1.97) (0.82) 
    
Industry indicators  YES YES 
N  8,264 3,680 
Adj. R2  0.354 0.394 
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Table 5 
The Impact of Non-CEO Family Ownership vs. CEO Ownership 
 
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. We 
further require the availability of CEO ownership. The regression model is as follows: 
titititi
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The dependent variable (NACC) is the negative of three-year average non-operating accruals times 100. 
Non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) is the proportion of shares held by non-CEO founding family 
members (and is zero for non-family firms). FOUNDER is the founder CEO indicator. CEO ownership 
(CEO_OWN) is the proportion of shares owned by CEOs. See notes to Table 2 for definitions of 
variables. Firm and year clustered t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For parsimony the results on 
control variables are not tabulated. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Intercept  -3.239 -3.382 -3.352 
  (-6.50) (-6.28) (-6.03) 
FAM_OWN   0.587 0.822 
   (2.96) (4.09) 
 
FOUNDER    0.290 
    (3.00) 
 
FAM_OWN × FOUNDER    -1.399 
    (-4.35) 
CEO ownership  -1.623 -1.723 -2.266 
  (-3.46) (-3.39) (-6.84) 
     
 
Control variables  YES YES YES 
Industry indicators  YES YES YES 
     
N  8,213 8,213 8,213 
Adj. R2  0.345 0.346 0.348 
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 Table 6 
The Impact of Non-CEO Family Ownership vs.  
Board Independence and Outside Director Ownership 
 
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. We 
further require the availability of board independence and director ownership. The regression model is as 
follows: 
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The dependent variable (NACC) is the negative of three-year average non-operating accruals times 100. 
Non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) is the proportion of shares held by non-CEO founding family 
members (and is zero for non-family firms). FOUNDER is the founder CEO indicator. Board 
independence (BOARDIND) is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Total outside 
director ownership (OUTSIDE_OWN) is the percentage of shares owned by all outside directors. Non-
family outside director ownership (nonFAM_OUTSIDE_OWN) is the percentage of shares owned by 
non-family outside directors. See notes to Table 2 for definitions of variables. Firm and year clustered t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. For parsimony the results on control variables are not tabulated. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Intercept -3.398 -3.541 -3.583 
 (-6.10) (-6.02) (-6.32) 
FAM_OWN  0.539 0.817 
  (2.83) (5.38) 
FOUNDER   0.190 
   (1.87) 
FAM_OWN × FOUNDER   -1.391 
   (-4.43) 
 
Board independence 0.150 0.141 0.125 
 (1.59) (1.67) (1.24) 
 
Total outside director ownership 0.477   
 (1.99)   
Non-family outside director ownership  0.072 0.412 
  (0.04) (0.30) 
    
Control variables YES YES YES 
Industry indicators YES YES YES 
    
N 8,110 8,110 8,110 
Adj. R2 0.351 0.350 0.352 
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Table 7 
The Impact of Non-CEO Family Ownership vs.  
Concentrated Institutional Ownership 
 
The sample consists of 8,264 firm-years from 1,204 firms in the S&P 1500 index over 1996-2005. The 
regression model is as follows: 
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The dependent variable (NACC) is the negative of three-year average non-operating accruals times 100. 
Non-CEO family ownership (FAM_OWN) is the proportion of shares held by non-CEO founding family 
members (and is zero for non-family firms). FOUNDER is the founder CEO indicator. Concentrated 
institutional ownership (INST_CON) is measured as holdings by the top 5 institutions, by dedicated 
institutions (Bushee 1998), and by long-term institutions (Gasper et al., 2005) in Column (1), (2), and (3). 
Other institutional ownership (INST_OTHER) is the difference between total institutional ownership and 
concentrated institutional ownership. The list of control variables are the same as in Table 3 except that 
total institutional ownership (INST) is excluded. See notes to Table 2 for definitions of variables. Firm 
and year clustered t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For parsimony the results on control variables 
are not tabulated. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Top 5 
institutional 
ownership 
Dedicated 
institutional 
ownership 
Long-term 
institutional 
ownership 
Intercept  -3.346 -3.454 -3.370 
  (-6.92) (-6.50) (-6.34) 
FAM_OWN  0.894 0.879 0.929 
  (3.82) (4.77) (4.92) 
FOUNDER  0.183 0.186 0.206 
  (1.54) (1.50) (1.78) 
FAM_OWN × FOUNDER  -1.346 -1.337 -1.383 
  (-3.95) (-3.89) (-4.29) 
     
Concentrated institutional ownership  0.415 0.004 0.056 
  (0.75) (0.04) (0.10) 
Other institutional ownership  0.346 0.527 0.458 
  (1.07) (2.26) (1.81) 
     
Control variables  YES YES YES 
Industry indicators  YES YES YES 
     
N  8,264 8,264 8,264 
Adj. R2  0.389 0.388 0.389 
 
 
